In standard models of ambiguity, the evaluation of an ambiguous asset, as of a risky asset, is considered as an independent process. In this process only information directly pertaining to the ambiguous asset is used. These models face significant challenges from the finding that ambiguity aversion is more pronounced when an ambiguous asset is evaluated alongside a risky asset than in isolation. To explain this phenomenon, we developed a theoretical model based on reference dependence in probabilities. According to this model, individuals (1) form subjective beliefs on the potential winning probability of the ambiguous asset; (2) use the winning probability of the (simultaneously presented) risky asset as a reference point to evaluate the potential winning probabilities of the ambiguous asset; (3) code potential winning probabilities of the ambiguous asset that are greater than the reference point as gains and those that are smaller than the reference point as losses; (4) weight losses in probability heavier than gains in probability. We tested the crucial assumption, reference dependence in probabilities, in an experiment and found supporting evidence.
Introduction
The evaluation of ambiguous assets is much more complicated than risky assets due to the absence of objective probabilities. Savage (1954) suggests that individuals could form subjective additive beliefs. The subjective beliefs could then be used to evaluate the ambiguous assets according to the expected utility theory. Ellsberg (1961) , however, presented compelling examples in which people prefer to bet on known rather than on unknown probabilities. One version of the Ellsberg paradox is as follows: There are two urns: a known urn and an unknown urn. The known urn contains 50 white and 50 black balls. The unknown urn also contains 100 black and white balls, but the proportion of black and white balls is unknown. For either urn, an individual first chooses a color and then draws a ball from the urn. She receives 100 if the color of chosen ball matches her chosen color. Typically, an individual is willing to pay less for the gamble on the unknown urn than on the known urn. Several variations of Ellsberg's (1961) original designs have been implemented in laboratory experiments, and a similar discount on the unknown urn was observed (see Wakker, 2010 , for a review of the literature). This phenomenon, termed ambiguity aversion, is inconsistent with Savage's (1954) subjective expected utility model. Ambiguity aversion has received tremendous research interest and numerous models have been put forward to explain it: Schmeidler's (1989) Choquet expected utility, Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) maxmin expected utility, Klibanoff et al.'s (2005) smooth ambiguity model; Nau's (2006) multistage recursive model, and Abdellaoui et al.'s (2011) non-expected utility model of source functions, to name just a few leading examples.
These approaches face serious descriptive difficulties since the work of Fox and Tversky (1995) . They showed that the willingness to pay for the ambiguous asset was not systematically different from the risky asset when each of them was evaluated in isolation. Only when the ambiguous asset was evaluated alongside the risky asset, ambiguity aversion became more pronounced. Fox and Tversky (1995) refer to this effect as 'comparative ignorance'. Chow and Sarin (2002) and Fox and Weber (2002) extended Fox and Tversky's (1995) experiment and provided further evidence that a significant portion of ambiguous aversion results from the fact that the ambiguous and the risky asset were evaluated to-gether. This is a fundamentally different perspective of the evaluation of an ambiguous asset. As stated by Wakker (2000) : "Fox and Tversky's finding seems to place the Ellsberg paradox in an entirely new light".
In standard models of ambiguity, the evaluation of an ambiguous asset, as of a risky asset, is considered to be an independent process. In this process only information directly pertaining to the ambiguous asset is used. We believe, while this assumption seems appropriate for the evaluation of a risky asset with clearly defined objective probabilities, it is too strong for the evaluation of an ambiguous asset. Given that there is little information about the ambiguous asset per se, it seems natural that individuals attempt to 'improve' their evaluation of the ambiguous asset by using other information. One reasonable way would be to find a risky asset with a similar structure and use it as reference. As a result, the evaluation of the ambiguous asset becomes simpler and clearer. We therefore suggest that individuals are inclined to use of the information pertaining to the risky asset in the evaluation of the ambiguous asset when the two types of assets are presented together.
There are a number of ways to use the information of the risky asset. One interesting way is suggested by Trautmann et al. (2011) . They argue that subjects take the value -the Willingness To Pay (WTP) -of the risky prospect as a reference point for their valuation of the ambiguous prospect, and loss aversion in the payoffs could result in ambiguity aversion. Trautmann et al.'s (2011) approach can explain the findings in Fox and Tversky (1995) without deviating much from prospect theory. However, it seems a rather complicate process to first complete the valuation process of the risky asset and then use that value as a reference point to evaluate the payoffs of the ambiguous prospect. Note that the payoffs are the same between the risky and ambiguous prospects in their study; it is the information on probability dimension that differs the ambiguous prospect from the risky prospect. In a recent paper, Arieli et al. (2011) found -via tracking subjects' eyeball movements -that most subjects, when comparing two risky prospects, compare payoffs and probabilities separately. Thus it seems counter-intuitive that subjects facing ambiguous prospect and risky asset would quickly resolve their difficulty in the probability dimension -which are different between the two -and instead focus on the payoff domain -which are the same for the two and thus deserves less attention.
For this reason, we shall use a slightly different approach. Empirical studies on ambiguity aversion typically used the same monetary payoff structure between the risky asset and the ambiguous asset. Also, in most valuation models of ambiguous assets payoffs and probabilities are treated separately. 1 Thus, with the same payoff structure, the manipulation of probabilities seems to remain as the most likely explanation for Fox and Tversky's (1995) findings without introducing additional effects. Based on this observation, we hypothesize that, when the risky asset and the ambiguous asset are presented together, (1) individuals form subjective beliefs on the potential winning probability of the ambiguous asset; (2) they use the winning probability of the risky asset as the reference point to evaluate the potential winning probabilities of the ambiguous asset; (3) analogous to prospect theory where payoffs are coded as gains or losses relative to a reference point, they code potential winning probabilities of the ambiguous asset that are greater than the reference point as gains and probabilities smaller than the reference point as losses; (4) finally and again in analogy to prospect theory, individuals exhibit loss aversion in probability by assigning a larger weight to losses in probability than to the same amount of gains in probability.
Henceforth we shall refer this set of assumptions as 'reference-dependence hypothesis'.
Further, in order to distinguish between ambiguity aversion in isolation and ambiguity aversion in combination with a risky asset, we shall call the latter 'reference-dependent ambiguity aversion'.
Our approach differs substantially from the prevailing explanation of comparative ignorance, which is typically interpreted as a companion of the "competence hypothesis" (Heath and Tversky, 1991) . According to this hypothesis, people try to avoid ambiguity in areas of incompetence, while they exhibit less ambiguity aversion if they feel more competent in the decision domain. Referring to the competence hypothesis, Fox and Tversky (1995) and Heath and Tversky (1991) argue that the joint presentation of the two assets highlights the relative incompetence about the ambiguous urn, resulting in a lower value for it.
The aim of this paper is to accommodate Fox and Tversky's (1995) findings without introducing additional elements such as individuals' perceptions of competence. The central idea of our approach is the use of the risky asset as a reference point in probability for the evaluation of the ambiguous asset. In doing this, we are more in line with (cumulative) prospect theory and not the competence hypothesis. We tested our crucial assumption, the reference-dependence of ambiguity aversion, in an experiment and found supporting evidence.
In many studies, ambiguity aversion is also found without an explicit comparable risky asset. Chow and Sarin (2002) , for example, while finding evidence consistent with Fox and Tversky (1995) , also report sizable ambiguity aversion without a directly comparable risky asset. This finding is not inconsistent with our model. Even when the ambiguous asset is valued in isolation, individuals might still try to simplify the evaluation process by finding a reference that is not explicitly presented. Such a reference is often rather salient.
For example, in the two-color Ellsberg urn mentioned above it seems natural to think of the probability 0.5 as the reference. Fox and Weber's (2002) study on, inter alia, order effects also indicates that reference-dependent ambiguity aversion can extend beyond a directly comparative evaluation context. Of course, individuals might be less loss averse in probabilities when the reference is not explicitly mentioned.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 demonstrates the theoretical model, Section 3 presents the experimental design. Results are reported in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The Model
There are two assets, one is risky (denoted by R) and the other is ambiguous (denoted by U ). To simplify the derivation, let's assume that there are only two states of world: a good state and a bad state. For the risky asset there is an objective probability p 0 for the good state (and thus 1 − p 0 for the bad state). Individuals receive some monetary payment G if the good state realizes, and zero otherwise. We let v(G) denote the utility or value that individuals attach to a monetary payoff of G, where v(0) = 0. Without loss of generality, we normalize v(G) ≡ 1. Since our main purpose is a descriptive one, we followed prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) .
We assume that individuals evaluate the risky asset in the following way:
where π(p 0 ) is the probability weighting function.
For the ambiguous asset, there is no clear probability one can assign to the good state.
One can, however, form a subjective belief for the good state. Let p denote the subjective probability an individual assigns to the good state, and let F (p) denote the cumulative subjective belief distribution that the individual has about the probability p. Then, if an individual behaves according to the subjective expected utility model, she should evaluate the ambiguous asset as follows:
which is independent of p 0 (and therefore the value of the risky asset).
But the individual might use the objective probability of the risky asset as a reference to evaluate her subjective probability of the good state under ambiguity. Analogous to prospect theory, where payoffs are coded as gains or losses relative to a reference point, we assume that the individual codes p larger than p 0 as gains in probability and p smaller than p 0 as losses in probability. Moreover, the individual evaluates gains and losses in probability differently. Let l(p − p 0 ), p < p 0 , denote the way the individual evaluates losses in probability, and g(p − p 0 ), p ≥ p 0 denote the way the individual evaluates gains in probability. Let ∆ denote the absolute difference between p and p 0 . In the spirit of loss aversion in prospect theory, we assume that
for any equal amount of difference in probability losses in probability are always weighted more heavily than gains in probability. With above assumptions, the evaluation process becomes
In equation (3) A distinction between the evaluating functions of gains and losses in probability we used here and the probability weighting functions used in (cumulative) prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992 ) must be made. In (cumulative) prospect theory, π + (π − ) stands for the probability weighting function for gains (losses) in the payoff domain. Although the two probability weighting functions are allowed to be different in gains and losses of payoffs, this difference is not important for any of the central results in prospect theory. Also, empirically there is no strong evidence suggesting differences between the two functions. The g(∆) and l(−∆) we used here represent the evaluation functions of gains and of losses in the probability domain. We assume that individuals weight losses in probability heavier than gains in probability. This assumption is the main driving force of our model. In prospect theory a closer companion to g(∆) or l(−∆) would be the value functions of payoffs in gains or losses.
Apart from this assumption, the parametric form of the two functions can be rather general. It is not even required that the two functions are continuous or differentiable.
Yet, it could be useful to think of some simple and intuitive ways of capturing loss aversion in probability. Analogous to the definition of loss aversion in prospect theory we could choose the following specification: g(∆) = ∆ α and l(−∆) = −λ(∆) α , where λ > 1 is the loss aversion coefficient and α is some constant. Another specification could be g(∆) = ∆ α and l(−∆) = −(∆) β , where α > β captures loss aversion in probability. Since our theory is mainly motivated by loss aversion in prospect theory, we shall use the former to illustrate the main features of the model. Using the latter does not change the result qualitatively.
Some Examples
In the following we will use a few examples to provide an intuitive illustration of the implications of the ambiguity component in equation (3). Let's assume that the subjective belief of p is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, i.e. F (p) = p. This assumption is strictly for illustrative purposes. In general, F (p) should be context specific and could be different for different individuals. Consider first the Ellsberg paradox, where the objective probability of the risky asset is 0.5. In this case, p 0 = 0.5, and thus the ambiguity component is Figure 1: The graph is produced by assuming F (p) = p, g(∆) = ∆ 0.7 , and l(∆) = −1.5(∆) 0.7 .
(top right). Hence, the ambiguity component is negative,
which represents ambiguity aversion in the Ellsberg paradox. Note that this result can be obtained for any F (p) that gives a symmetric density mass around p 0 , as long as the assumption of loss aversion in probability is satisfied.
In some ambiguous situations we could have p 0 larger than 0. 
The calculation is illustrated in the middle graph of Figure 1 . As the negative area is larger than the positive area, the ambiguity component is negative and, consequently, there is ambiguity aversion.
Finally, in some ambiguous situations we could have p 0 much smaller than 0.5. Consider the two five-color-urns mentioned above. For each urn, an individual can now choose only one color and wins if the drawn ball matches this color. In this scenario, p 0 = 0.2, and the ambiguity component is:
As illustrated in the bottom graph of Figure 1 , the negative area is now smaller than the positive area, and, consequently, the ambiguity component is positive. That is, in situations where the objective reference probability is small, individuals are ambiguity seeking.
This result is not as unusual as it may first appear. In fact, several studies provided evidence of ambiguity seeking when the objective probability of winning an ambiguous gamble was small (see Camerer and Weber, 1992, Table 3 , for an overview).
Links to Other Models
So far, purely for illustrative purposes, we have assumed F (p) = p when p 0 is small As we normalized V (G) ≡ 1, the value of the risky asset is simply π(p 0 ). We can take a similar perspective for the value of the ambiguous asset. Let V (U ) ≡ Π(p 0 ), we could regard the value of the ambiguous asset as its weighting function in an ambiguous situation. A comparison between π(p 0 ) and Π(p 0 ) then reflects the difference between decision making under risk and under ambiguity. Figure 2 provides such a comparison.
where N (−p0, 1 − p0) denotes the cumulative mass between −p0 and 1 − p0. However, in their experimental setting, there often exists a salient probability that may be used as reference. 5 Hence, although the subjects in Abdellaoui et al.'s (2011) study did not explicitly face a risky asset as comparison, they might nevertheless have formed an implicit reference when evaluating the ambiguous asset. Of course, based on the finding of Fox and Tversky (1995) , ambiguity aversion should be weaker when the reference is not explicit. This may explain why our model suggests a stronger certainty effect than the empirical findings in Abdellaoui et al. (2011) , as revealed by a larger gap in our curve when p 0 approaches 0 or 1. 6
Experimental Design
The crucial assumption in our model is the reference-dependence hypothesis, which states that the objective probability of the risky asset is used as a reference to evaluate the subjective probability of the underlying state of the ambiguous asset. Thus, unlike other models of ambiguity, our model suggests that the probability of the risky asset has an impact on the value of the ambiguous asset.
We decided to directly employ a relatively strong test condition: we held the ambiguous 4 Abdellaoui et al. (2011) used the certainty equivalence method to obtain the value of the ambiguous asset and the risky asset, but they never presented the two assets simultaneously to subjects. asset constant while we varied the winning probabilities of the risky asset. As the ambiguous asset remains the same, its value should, according to standard ambiguity models, remain constant no matter what risky asset is presented with it. If, however, the value of the ambiguous gamble changes with the variations in the probabilities of the risky asset, this direct effect can be interpreted as strong support for the reference-dependence hypothesis.
Another, more elaborate way of testing the our model is to vary the winning probabilities of the risky assets alongside several values of fixed underlying probabilities of the ambiguous asset. The willingness to pay (WTP) for the risky and for the ambiguous asset could then be used to produce a graph similar to the one in Figure 2 . However, as this test would primarily focus on the extended model, it is unnecessarily complicated for a basic test of the reference-dependence hypothesis.
Given that the ambiguous asset is fixed, a between-subjects design becomes a natural choice. We administered to each subject a questionnaire that described two gambles: one ambiguous and one risky. The ambiguous gamble was presented as a bag with 10 black and white chips of unknown proportion. The subject could first choose a color (white or black) and then draw a chip out of the bag. If the color of the chip matched the chosen color, she won 10 euro, and zero otherwise. 7 Similarly, the risky gamble was presented as a bag with 10 black and white chips of known proportion. The subject drew a chip out of the bag and if the chip was black, she won 10 euro, and zero otherwise. An example of the the questionnaire is shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5 in the Appendix. In all questionnaires, the ambiguous gamble was held constant and thus all subjects faced the same ambiguous gamble. Different subjects, however, faced different risky gambles. There were seven risky gambles: a bag with n black chips of a total 10 chips, where n=1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 9. These seven bags corresponded to seven risky gambles with a winning probability of 0.1, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, or 0.9 respectively, constituting seven treatments.
7 The fact that subjects were able to choose a color does not mean that the chosen color is governed by a belief distribution that always lies above a winning probability of 0.5. What is needed is that the belief distribution of the chosen color gives less mass on low winning probabilities and/or more mass to high winning probabilities than the unchosen color. For example, it would be sufficient if the subjective belief of the chosen color first order degree stochastically dominates the unchosen color.
Individuals typically read questionnaires from the left to the right. If individuals evaluate the gamble on the left hand side first, they might be more inclined to use the probability of the risky asset as the reference when it is presented on the left hand side. To test for such an order effect, we counter balanced the sides on which the risky and the ambiguous gamble were presented.
We elicited subjects' WTP for the risky gamble and the ambiguous gamble by using the BDM mechanism (Becker et al., 1964) . For the real payment of a subject, we generated a random number between 0 and 10 (by drawing a chip from a bag with 11 respectively numbered chips). The drawn number would then be compared with her WTP for the gamble on either the left or the right hand side (determined by a coin flip) of the questionnaire. If her WTP was smaller than the randomly generated number, then she would not get to play the gamble and her experiment ended. If the subject's WTP was equal to or larger than the randomly generated number, then she played the gamble, but payed only the price of the randomly generated number.
Constructing the ambiguous gamble properly is critical to the experiment. Although the construction procedure must be perfectly clear, the gamble itself should be regarded by students as ambiguous. We constructed the ambiguous gamble according to the following procedure, which was announced publicly before we implemented it. At the start of the experiment we asked ten randomly selected subjects, who did not participate in rest of the experiment, to pick an integer number between 0 to 10. We did not tell them how are we going to use those numbers. Each of them left the experimental room, secretely wrote the number on a small piece of paper, which they then folded, to hide the number.
They then brought the folded pieces of paper into the experimental room and we asked another randomly chosen subject, who did not participate in rest of the experiment, to help us with the construction of the ambiguous gamble. This helper randomly picked one of the ten folded papers. We then gave the helper two bags: one with 10 black chips and one with 10 white chips. We asked the helper to leave the experimental room and use the two bags to produce an ambiguous bag of 10 chips, in which the number of black chips should be the number on the paper she has drawn. When finished, the helper returned with two closed bags, placed the ambiguous bag on the desk in the front and stashed the other away. Neither the experimenters nor the subjects knew the contents of any of the two bags throughout the experiment.
The experiment was done on 7th September, 2011 in the Radboud University Nijmegen.
The subjects were 210 second year business and economics students in the bachelor course "Corporate Finance" (third lecture). Before the lecture started, we placed the questionnaires on the desks, with the back side facing up. To reduce the influence of peer students on one's decisions, we always left one empty seat between any two seats. Furthermore, we distributed the questionnaire in such a way that every student was surrounded by different treatments. When the lecture started, we guided students to their seats in an orderly manner. We asked them not to touch the questionnaire on the desk until we told them so.
They were also told that they could read the side that was facing up (which explained the payment procedure). Once the classroom was filled, we did not allow the rest of students to enter the classroom. They waited outside the classroom where we gave them some questionnaires to fill in to avoid making them feel excluded. Those questionnaires are, however, excluded from data analysis. After all students were seated, we asked them to flip the questionnaire around and to read the front side of questionnaire, but not to fill in the questionnaire yet. We gave students five minutes to read questionnaires. After the five minutes, we asked students to once again turn to the back side of the questionnaire.
We then read through the payment procedure aloud. We told the students that 20 of them would be chosen for real payment after the lecture. Subjects that were chosen for real payment would receive an endowment of 10 euro. In our explanations of the payment procedure, special attention was given to the BDM mechanism. 8 We asked students to raise their hands if they had any questions. Questions were answered individually.
We then carefully explained the procedure of constructing the ambiguous gamble (as described above). After the ambiguous gamble was produced, we placed the ambiguous bag on a desk in front of all students. We told them explicitly that this was the ambiguous bag described in their questionnaires. Questionnaires were then filled in and collected.
Each student retained an ID number that was also printed on the questionnaire. Then the lecture started. In a 15-minute break, after the first half of the lecture, we asked the student helper to randomly pick 20 questionnaires out of the pile. The ID numbers of these questionnaires were announced and shown on a screen. The students with these ID numbers were asked to stay after the lecture. The rest was allowed to also stay and watch the experiment, but they needed to be quiet. After the lecture was over, we asked the 20 students to come to the front of the classroom and show their ID number. For each student, we then determined via the BDM mechanism whether they could really play the gamble, as described above. Those who could not play the gamble received 10 euro and stayed outside of the experimental area. The others played the gamble. 9
In total the experiment (exluding lecture time) lasted about 45 minutes and the average payoff of the selected students was 9.88 Euro.
Experimental results
In total 210 students participated the experiment. Two students did not give their WTPs for the ambiguous gamble, and were therefore excluded from analysis. Table 1 summarizes the WTPs of the risk gambles with 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 black chips (corresponding a winning probability of 0. 1, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.9) , and WTPs of the ambiguous gamble that were presented along with them. We further split the WTPs by the positioning of the risky gamble on the questionnaire, that is, whether the risky gamble was shown on the left or on the right side of the questionnaire. As can be seen by comparing the WTPs of the ambiguous and the risky gamble on the row of 0.5 winning probability, there is significant ambiguity aversion. The mean and median WTPs of the risky gamble with 0.5 winning probability are 4.28 and 4.5, whereas the mean and median of the ambiguous gamble are 3.35 and 3.0, respectively. A two-sided wilcoxon test shows that the difference is significant (p < 0.01). Table 1 : WTPs of the risky gamble and the ambiguous gamble. "Left" ("right") means the risky gamble was on the left (right) hand side of the questionnaire.
If students behaved according to standard models of ambiguity, we should not observe much variation of the WTPs of the ambiguous gamble when the probability of the risky gamble changes. This is clearly not what we observed in the data. As we can see from Table 1 , the ambiguity aversion is most pronounced when the risky gamble has a winning probability of 0. Figure 2 is produced by varying the ambiguous gamble along with p0, in such a way that the ambiguous gamble has an "ambiguity neutral" probability of p0. But here the ambiguous gamble is fixed. The students typically read from the left to the right. This implies that they could have read and evaluated the left hand side gamble first. This could have an important implication for our model: if the risky gamble was positioned on the left hand side, subjects might have been more inclined to use its winning probability as reference for the ambiguous gamble on the right hand side than the other way around. Consequently, reference-dependent ambiguity aversion could be more pronounced when the risky gamble was shown on the left hand side. To check this possibility we compared the WTPs of the ambiguous gamble when the risky gamble was presented on the left and on the right. We find statistically significant differences in WTPs for ambiguous gambles that were presented with the risky gambles of 0.1, 0.3, and 0.6 winning probabilities (one-sided wilcoxon test, p < 0.05). In contrast, when the risky gambles of 0.4 and 0.9 were on the left hand side the average ambiguous WTPs were even lower, although not statistically significant (two-sided wilcoxon test, p > 0.10). All together, there seems to be a tendency for a more pronounced ambiguity aversion on the right hand side of the questionnaire, but the evidence is sparse. 11
This result is consistent with the finding in Alevy (2011) , where they found that subjects priced ambiguous assets lower than risky assets only when they were previously exposed to risky assets.
We calculated each subject's risk aversion as the difference of the risk neutral evaluation 10 × p and her WTP for the risky gamble. As a measure of ambiguity aversion, we subtracted each subject's WTP for the ambiguous gamble from the mean of the risky gamble with a winning probability of 0.5 (4.28 on average). We then computed the nonparametric Spearman correlation of the risk aversion and ambiguity aversion and found a statistically significant positive correlation of 0.49 (p < 0.01). This result is consistent with the study of Bossaerts et al. (2010) , where the authors suggest that a positive riskambiguity correlation may be able to explain the 'value effect' in historical financial market data.
Discussion
In this paper we propose a novel approach to explain ambiguity aversion. The central idea is the use of a more or less salient reference point in probability for the evaluation of the ambiguous asset. We argue that individuals form subjective beliefs on the potential winning probability of the ambiguous asset and that the winning probability of risky asset in the classic setting of Fox and Tversky (1995) is used as a reference point to evaluate the potential winning probabilities of the ambiguous asset. Analogous to prospect theory where payoffs are coded as gains or losses relative to a reference point, potential winning probabilities of the ambiguous asset that are greater than the reference point are coded as gains and probabilities smaller than the reference point are coded as losses, and individuals exhibit loss aversion in probability by assigning a larger weight to losses in probability than to the same amount of gains in probability. We tested the crucial assumption of the model, reference-dependence, in an experiment and found supporting evidence.
Our approach and explanation of ambiguity aversion is fundamentally different from standard models, which attempt to explain ambiguity aversion as an isolated phenomenon.
Also, our approach differs from the predominant explanation of comparative ignorance, first presented by Fox and Tversky (1995) . As a companion of the competence hypothesis (Heath and Tversky, 1991) , the comparative ignorance hypothesis per se does not depend on a comparison or even a reference point, but on the perception of (in)competence as a state of mind. Although the original experimental design presentated the risky and the ambiguous urn together, (in)competence about an ambiguous situation can also be created in settings without direct comparisons where the ambiguous urn is effectively evaluated in isolation (see e.g. Camerer and Weber, 1992) , but under different perceptions of competence.
In contrast, our approach does not assume that ambiguity is evaluated in isolation. We suggest that people try to evaluate ambiguity by comparing it to a similar, but less ambiguous situation of, ideally, pure risk. If such a salient risky comparison exists, we argue that this is readily used as a reference point in probability for the ambiguous situation.
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